tainable firm differences (Ginsberg, 1994) . Nor propositions based on the model at the individual, firm, and interfirm levels of analysis to explain has the resource-based view addressed the process of resource selection, that is, how firms actually optimal resource decisions and firm heterogeneity.
The concepts of resource capital and institutional make, and fail to make, rational resource choices in pursuit of economic rents.
capital are then introduced to explain how the model can be applied more specifically to the In the spirit of extending the resource-based perspective, this paper's purpose is to provide prediction of competitive advantage. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research. a model of firm heterogeneity and sustainable advantage that incorporates the social context of resource selection. To this end, a resource-based view is combined with insights from the new LITERATURE REVIEW institutionalism in organization theory (DiMaggio Review of the resource-based perspective and Powell, 1983 and Powell, , 1991 Scott, 1987 Scott, , 1995 . Institutional theory examines the role of social influ-A resource-based view proposes that resource selection and accumulation are a function of both ence and pressures for social conformity in shaping organizations' actions. Drawing on an within-firm decision-making and external strategic factors. Within-firm managerial choices are institutional perspective, this paper argues that resource selection and sustainable competitive guided by an economic rationality and by motives of efficiency, effectiveness and profitability advantage are profoundly influenced, at the individual, firm, and interfirm level, by the insti- (Conner, 1991) . External influences are strategic industry factors that impact the firm, including tutional context of resource decisions. The institutional context refers here to rules, norms, and buyer and supplier power, intensity of competition, and industry and product market structure. beliefs surrounding economic activity that define or enforce socially acceptable economic behavior. These factors influence what resources are selected, as well as how they are selected and At the individual level, the institutional context includes decision-makers' norms and values; at deployed.
Whether resource selection and deployment the firm level, organizational culture and politics; and at the interfirm level, public and regulatory result in enduring variation across firms will depend on factor market imperfections, defined pressures and industry-wide norms. The premise of this paper is that institutional factors surround-as barriers to acquisition, imitation, and substitution of key resources or inputs (Barney, 1986 , ing resource decisions affect the potential for firms to earn economic rents. 1991 , 1994 Penrose, 1959; Schoemaker and Amit, 1994) . These barriers inhibit competitors' Based on this premise, the paper introduces a model of sustainable competitive advantage that abilities to obtain or duplicate critical resources and lead to long-run differences among firms in combines resource-based and institutional factors at the individual, firm, and interfirm levels of their ability to generate rents. When strategic factor markets are imperfect or incomplete, they analysis. Propositions are developed for each level of analysis, based on the interaction of resource-create barriers to resource mobility and an unequal distribution of resources across competbased and institutional factors, to explain (a) when managers will be more likely to make ing firms (Barney, 1986; Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . Resource market characteristics, in turn, optimal resource choices, and (b) when optimal resource choices will be more likely to lead to shape resource characteristics and the rent potential of resources. The persistence of rents from firm heterogeneity and economic rents. The model (Figure 1 ) is built on two key divergent assump-resources depends fundamentally on the features of the resources themselves. These resource tions of the resource-based and institutional perspectives. These are, respectively, an economic characteristics include whether resources are scarce, unique, inimitable, durable, idiosyncratic, vs. social motivation for human behavior and an economic vs. social explanation for the effects of nontradeable, intangible and nonsubstitutable (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991 ; environment on competitive advantage.
The next sections review the resource-based Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt, 1984) . Rent-generating resource traits view and institutional theory. The paper then introduces the proposed model and develops develop not only from factor market imperfec- tions but also from unique historical circum- (Scott, 1995; Zucker, 1987) . According to institutional theorists, conformity to social expecstances (e.g., a valuable physical location) and the accumulation of specialized capabilities tations contributes to organizational success and survival (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Carroll and (Barney, 1991) .
Therefore, from a resource-based perspective, Hannan, 1989; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991) . As Scott (1987: 498) observes, sustainable competitive advantage is the outcome of discretionary rational managerial choices, se-'organizations . . . conform because they are rewarded for doing so through increased legitlective resource accumulation and deployment, strategic industry factors, and factor market imacy, resources, and survival capabilities. ' Unlike economic and strategic frameworks, which imperfections. Consistent with a strategic orientation, the resource-based view assumes that eco-examine the extent to which firm behavior is rational and economically justified, institutional nomic motives drive resource procurement decisions and that economic factors in the firm's theorists emphasize the extent to which firm behavior is compliant, habitual, unreflective, and competitive and resource environments drive firm conduct and outcomes. socially defined. Institutional theorists are especially interested in how organizational structures and processes Review of institutional theory become institutionalized over time (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987) . InstiFrom an institutional perspective, firms operate within a social framework of norms, values, and tutionalized activities are those actions that tend to be enduring, socially accepted, resistant to taken-for-granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic change, and not directly reliant on rewards or monitoring for their persistence (Oliver, 1992) . behavior. Economic choices are constrained not only by the technological, informational, and Institutionalized activities for which there is no obvious economic or technical purpose are of income limits that neoclassical models emphasize but by socially constructed limits that are dis-particular theoretical interest because their perpetuation cannot be explained by rational choice tinctly human in origin, like norms, habits, and customs. The institutional view suggests that the frameworks. A firm, for example, that retains the same unreliable supplier over a period of years motives of human behavior extend beyond economic optimization to social justification and may be perpetuating this institutionalized activity simply out of habit, even though the firm believes social obligation (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990) . As partial captives of social convention, individ-such allegiance to be rational. When managers, for example, justify actions with the claim that uals and organizations are assumed to be approval seeking, susceptible to social influence, and rela-'we've always done it this way,' 'everybody does it this way' or 'that's just the way things are done tively intractable creatures of habit and tradition around here,' they are referring to institutionalized that individuals are motivated to optimize available economic choices. According to institutional activities. Institutional theorists argue that many activities in firms (e.g., approaches to managing theory, firms make normatively rational choices that are shaped by the social context of the firm, employees, routines for assigning resources) are so taken for granted or so strongly endorsed by whereas the resource-based view suggests that firms make economically rational choices that are the firm's prevailing culture or power structure that decision-makers no longer even question the shaped by the economic context of the firm.
Institutional theory also suggests that external appropriateness or rationality of these activities.
Institutional theory suggests that insti-social pressures (e.g., government regulations, public interest groups) reduce variation in firms' tutionalized activities are the result of interrelated processes at the individual, organizational, and structures and strategies, whereas the resourcebased view suggests that factor market imperfecinterorganizational levels of analysis. At the individual level, managers' norms, habits, and uncon-tions (e.g., factors that inhibit the imitation of resources) increase variation in firms' resources scious conformity to traditions account for institionalized activites (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) . and resource strategies.
Institutional theory, therefore, has several At the firm level, corporate culture, shared belief systems, and political processes supporting given implications for a resource-based view of firm variation: (1) firms can be captives of their own ways of managing perpetuate institutionalized structures and behaviors. At the interorgani-history and make inappropriate resource decisions; (2) sunk costs can be cognitive rather zational level, pressures emerging from government, industry alliances, and societal expectations than economic and lead to suboptimal resource choices; (3) cultural support for resource invest-(rules, norms, and standards about product quality, occupational safety, or environmental man-ments may be an important determinant of their success; (4) firms may be unwilling rather than agement, for example) define socially acceptable firm conduct, and those social pressures common unable to imitate resources and capabilities, especially when those resources lack legitimacy to all firms in the same sector cause firms to exhibit similar structures and activities (DiMaggio or social approval; and (5) social influences exerted on firms reduce the potential for firm and Powell, 1983) .
The basic premise of institutional theory, then, heterogeneity. These implications for resource decisions and firm heterogeneity are elaborated is that firms' tendencies toward conformity with predominant norms, traditions, and social influ-below at the individual, firm, and interfirm levels of analysis. ences in their internal and external environments lead to homogeneity among firms in their structures and activities, and that successful firms are those that gain support and legitimacy by COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: A PROPOSED MODEL conforming to social pressures. In contrast, the basic argument of the resource-based view is Basic definitions that rare, specialized, inimitable resources and resource market imperfections cause firm hetero- Figure 1 (Barney, 1986) or below that the process of resource procurement and accumulation is often normatively rational, built up through cumulative firm experience and 'learning by doing' (Cool and Dierickx, 1994;  and that this leads to suboptimal resource decisions and the suboptimal use of accumulated Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990: 91) . Examples of valued resources and resources. Therefore, differences among firms in their management of normative rationality will be capabilities include reputation, buyer-supplier relationships, tacit knowledge, R&D expertise, an important source of competitive advantage.
Economic and normative rationalities emphaand technological capabilities (Barney, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Rao, 1994 ; Schoe-size different choice constraints and inducements.
Economically rational resource decisions are maker and Amit, 1994).
Differences among firms in the resources they value-maximizing choices constrained by imperfect information and uncertainty about future outselect and accumulate generate firm heterogeneity (Barney, 1991 Penrose, 1959 economic rationality which is motivated by efficiency and profitability, normative rationality Ginsberg, 1994; Zajac, 1992; Zajac and Bazer- Since the presence of sunk costs means that managers are reluctant to reassess their resource man, 1991), as well as causal ambiguity, that is, limits on the ability to discern the relation decisions, these costs are a potentially important source of heterogeneity in the resource selection between a firm's bundle of resources and its performance (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Reed process. Leonard-Barton (1992: 118) noted, for example, how the culture at Chemicals corpoand DeFillippi, 1990). In contrast, normatively rational resource decisions are value-laden choices ration valued chemical engineers over mechanical engineers, and vested interests supported projects constrained by firm history and the social context of decision-making. From this perspective, involving polymers over equipment projects; these 'deeply embedded knowledge sets,' as cogresource decisions are vulnerable to economic suboptimization because they occur in the context nitive sunk costs, created negatively reinforcing cycles that impeded new product development. of corporate norms and traditions, and these norms and traditions can limit managers' willingConstraints on optimal resource choices are also a function of resource longevity. Some ness to acquire new resources or to change their current resource portfolios. As Ginsberg (1994: resources owe their distinctiveness and inimitability to their longevity within the firm (Conner, 158) observes, 'strong institutional pressures abide in the evaluation of current resource allo-1991; Teece, 1988; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997) . These history-or path-dependent resources cations and in hindering acceptance of resource deployments. ' (e.g., specialized technical expertise, unique R& D capabilities) are rooted in the history and Corporate history and traditions are most likely to generate suboptimal resource choices when culture of firms and derive their value from time compression diseconomies, that is, from developinvestments in current resources represent cognitive sunk costs (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; ment over a long period of time (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Conner, 1991; Dierickx and Powell, 1991) . Cognitive sunk costs are the social and psychological costs associated with altering Cool, 1989; Powell, 1991; Teece, 1988 ). Yet it is the embeddedness of these institutionalized firm habits and routines that prevent firms from seeking economically feasible alternatives. Cogni-competencies in history that also increases their likelihood of being perpetuated without question. tive sunk costs include, for example, employees' fears about learning new skills or competencies, Chrysler's inability to see the value of smaller car production in the mid-1970s, for example, a firm's reluctance to digress from its founder's vision, management's concern that resource was a result of unquestioning conformity to the firm's historical competencies. Traditional core changes will erode management's power, and an unwillingness on the part of the top management competencies have the potential to become 'core rigidities' that inhibit subsequent development team to be disloyal to corporate traditions. Even when changes in current resources are eco-and success (Leonard-Barton, 1992) . As Teece (1988: 265) has observed, firms have limited nomically rational, such reluctance to change occurs for any of three reasons: because individ-abilities to change their competencies 'because a firm's learning domain is defined in part by where uals find it difficult to alter entrenched organizational habits and routines; because change to it has been.' Longstanding core competencies typically less familiar practices precipitates fear or uncertainty; or because the replacement of traditional become taken for granted as indispensable assets, not because of their demonstrated superiority practices with new ones may be perceived as socially unjustifiable or disloyal to company under a variety of competitive conditions, but because their longevity is considered sufficient norms and values. Cognitive sunk costs will be especially prevalent in resource decisions when evidence of their value. Xerox, for example, took for granted that its traditional competence in servthe abandonment of familiar routines is disruptive or inconvenient, when anticipated change gener-icing copiers was a key strategic capability until Canon 'designed service out of its product' by ates insecurity, when changes in resource allocations violate company norms, or when current substituting superior product design for an extensive service network (Dierickx and Cool, 1989 : resource investments are supported by vested interests (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Oliver, 1509) . These 'competency traps' (Barnett, Greve, and Park, 1994; Levitt and March, 1988) are 1992; Powell, 1991; Teece, 1988) . more likely to occur, the longer a particular these traditions is so taken for granted that they are no longer even questioned. resource or capability has served a firm, and the more integral its role in the firms's culture and Firms will be willing to defy tradition when declining performance, economic crises, or operations. This means that when environmental demands shift, the firm's most deeply rooted increasingly outdated processes or practices make the need for change more obvious or urgent. For competencies may, paradoxically, pose the most serious challenge to sustainable advantage. Stated example, a firm will often hire a new CEO or manager under these circumstances to shake up differently, it is the path-dependent assets in a firm's resource portfolio that may become its the status quo. A firm will be more likely to acquire new resources when top management no most limiting liabilities when competitive conditions change.
longer values existing resources or capabilities (including human resources) because they are To summarize, normative rationality generates the potential for cognitive sunk costs and taken-perceived to be obsolete or detrimental to firm performance. These arguments suggest the followfor-granted conformity to established traditions. These social constraints on resource decisions ing propositions: place boundary conditions on the capacity of firms to acquire valued resources and to make We would expect that constraints on resource that the acquired resources replace are no longer valued by top management acquisition will be lower when the resources that the acquired resources replace are not central to the firm's operations and identity. For example, The rent-generating capacity of resources emerges not only from those resources that are acquired General Mill's delay in moving away from its original core business (commodity flour) toward but also from those that are developed within the firm over time (Barnett et al., 1994 ; Dierickx more value-enhancing competencies (Porter, 1980) resulted from the uncertainty and dis-and Cool, 1989) . As noted earlier, resources and capabilities that are developed and sustained over comfort of relinquishing a core tradition. When a firm has a strong social and operational iden-time are vulnerable to cognitive sunk costs because individuals find it difficult, for reasons tification with a competency that is being replaced, the firm will be more reluctant to aban-of loyalty, fear, or habit, to replace or abandon long-standing traditions and routines. When indidon the competence. The likelihood that a valued resource is acquired will also be inversely related viduals conform to customary practices for a long period of time, they tend to take the legitimacy to its departure from firm traditions. The more closely aligned a new resource or capability is of these practices for granted and not question their usefulness. Therefore, a firm will be more perceived to be with firm traditions, the higher the likelihood that it will be acquired. Firm tra-likely to make optimal use of accumulated resources when formal periodic evaluations of ditions, such as accepted ways of monitoring product quality, handling customers, or promoting the effectiveness of long-standing resources and capabilities are conducted. Given the potential products, are socially endorsed routines that become ratified by their longevity. Firms tend to force of habit in sustaining current resource practices, employees also need to be continually acquire resources that do not violate existing traditions, especially when the appropriateness of retrained and updated to ensure that the full potential of the resource is being utilized, includ-costs and tendencies toward conformity with traditions, that these social constaints affect resource ing resource innovations at the margin of the existing resource. In addition, to make optimal optimization, and that the effective management of these social constraints will increase a firm's use of accumulated resources, the criteria used to hire new personnel and to orient them to the use potential to earn economic rents. At the firm level of analysis, the social context of resource and value of a core resource or competency will need to be geared toward maintaining and decisions also affects the likelihood of optimal resource use and procurement. This occurs improving expertise in the use of the resource. In a review of the relevance of the resource-based through institutional isolating mechanisms, defined here as low levels of political or cultural view to human resource management, Wright and McMahan (1992: 302) observed that '[t]he issues support for resource decisions; this lack of support inhibits resource optimization. The term 'iso-. . . are the validity of the selection system and whether or not the organization is hiring only the lating mechanism' is normally used to denote imitability barriers which protect a firm's comhighest ability individuals.' The utility of a core competency will erode over time as personnel petitive advantage. Institutional isolating mechanisms are barriers to imitation which result from turn over if employee selection and orientation programs fail to ensure superior expertise and a firm's reluctance to imitate or acquire resources that are incompatible with the firm's cultural or support for the valued competency: political context. Isolating mechanisms, according to resourceProposition 2a: Firms will be more likely to make optimal use of accumulated resources based theory, are features of resources that prevent other firms from obtaining and replicating when the effectiveness of these resources is periodically and formally evaluated.
them (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Rumelt, 1984) . Examples include skills, knowledge, and capabilities that are tacit, unique, invisible, comProposition 2b: Firms will be more likely to make optimal use of accumulated resources plex, or path dependent (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982 ; when employees are continually retrained to ensure that the full potential of the resources Peteraf, 1993; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990) . These 'strategic' isolating mechanisms explain resource is being utilized.
mobility barriers as a function of firms' inabilities to acquire and imitate resources. In contrast, instiProposition 2c: Firms will be more likely to make optimal use of accumulated resources tutional isolating mechanisms explain resource mobility barriers as a function of firms' unwillwhen personnel selection and orientation programs support the use and importance of the ingness to acquire and imitate resources. An organization's refusal to acquire what it sees as resources.
a politically incompatible asset (e.g., a business school's reluctance to develop case method These six propositions, then, specify individuallevel factors that are expected to contribute to expertise) is an institutional isolating mechanism.
A managers's reluctance to acquire particular the optimal selection and accumulation of resources. Even when strategic factor markets are technological know-how because it contradicts the firm's 'low-tech' culture or violates the comperfectly competitive and firms have potentially equal access to rent-generating resources, firms pany's cultural belief system reflects institutional isolating mechanisms. may earn different rents as a result of differences in the effectiveness of human resource approaches Institutional isolating mechanisms can also be involuntary and exogenous. For example, when supporting resource selection and deployment.
regulators, local citizens, public interest groups or other firm stakeholders threaten to withdraw Firm-level determinants of resource choices:
support for a firm's products or services if it Strategic vs. institutional factors acquires a particular resource (e.g., an input harmful to the environment), the firm may choose Thus far we have argued that resource decisionmaking is a normatively rational process, that to forego an economically useful resource. Institutional isolating mechanisms exist when othernormative rationality generates cognitive sunk wise accessible resources and capabilities that petency from mainframes to microcomputers, and DEC's reluctance to embrace workstation capasupport a competitive advantage are nonetheless rejected by firms because they fail to fit with bilities inconsistent with their VAX machine competencies, all exemplify social rather than straprevailing cultural norms or political interests. Under these conditions, resources will fail to be tegic barriers to the acquisition and use of resources and capabilities. In these cases, the acquired and deployed and resource mobility will be low, not because the resources in question failure to acquire or deploy resources or competencies was due, not to their inaccessibility lack value or are difficult to acquire or replicate, but because the resources are inconsistent with or strategic inimitability, but to their perceived inconsistency with the firms' traditional operthe firm's historical, cultural, or political context. Stated differently, competition for valued ations and culture. Firms are much more likely to acquire valued resources when resource acquiresources among firms will be more limited when the available resources are perceived by firms as sition does not violate a firm's cultural norms and values (Ginsberg, 1994) . In addition, the culturally objectionable or politically inexpedient. Strategic and institutional isolating mechanisms political support of top management is indispensable to resource acquisition. Moreover, resource are contrasted in Table 2 .
Disney's reluctance in the 1970s to digress acquisitions are much less likely to occur if these acquisitions threaten the power base of the key from competencies espoused by its founder, IBM's initial reluctance to switch its core com-decision-makers in the organization. Therefore, political expediency is a critical contextual factor surrounding resource decisions. Decision-makers with the formal or informal authority to subvert (Barney and Hansen, 1994: 176; Sabel, 1993) . As rent-producing resources develop over that reduces labor intensity is less likely to be imitated by firms with cultures or policies that time, their optimization is a function of the political and cultural willingness of firm employees limit lay-offs. Therefore, barriers to resource mobility may be both economic and social in to commit to the use of these resources. This is much less likely to occur when trust is lacking origin. between managers and employees. Managers and employees working cooperatively are especially Interfirm causes of heterogeneity: Market likely to maximize firm capabilities when the imperfections vs. pressures for isomorphism partnership is characterized by strong form trust (Barney and Hansen, 1994) . Strong form trust Up until now we have examined institutional factors at the individual and firm level that conexists when 'opportunistic behavior would violate the values, principles and standards of behavior strain optimal resource decisions and have shown that differences in the management of social that have been internalized by parties to the exchange' (Barney and Hansen, 1994; 179) . norms and firm culture at the individual and firm levels can affect a firm's rent potential. Now we Strong form trust obviates the need for elaborate coercive mechanisms to enforce commitment to ask: are there institutional factors at the interfirm level of analysis that constrain firm heterogeneity resource deployment. Optimal use of existing resources will also be enhanced if performance and rent potential? At the interfirm level it is suggested that firm variation and rent potential will in the use of rent-generating resources is linked formally to the firm's incentive system: be a function of institutional influences exerted on firms by external constituents that define socially acceptable firm behavior (Oliver, 1991) .
Proposition 4a: Firms will be more likely to make optimal use of accumulated resources
In contrast to resource-based theory's focus on firm heterogeneity, institutional theorists ask 'why when top management is able to mobilize and sustain cultural and political support within there is such startling homogeneity of organizational forms and practices' (DiMaggio and the firm for the resources. Powell, 1983: 148) . Institutional theorists argue that organizations in the same population or Proposition 4b: Firms will be more likely to make optimal use of accumulated resources industry tend toward similarity over time because they conform to many common influences and when manager-employee relations are characterized by trust.
are interpenetrated by relationships that diffuse common knowledge and understandings (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Jepperson and Proposition 4c: Firms will be more likely to make optimal use of accumulated resources Meyer, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1988; Scott, 1987) . From a resource-based view, when the effective use of resources is tied formally to the firm's incentive system. imperfect and incomplete factor markets are the source of resource mobility barriers that give rise to firm heterogeneity. From an institutional In summary, these six propositions suggest that the rent capacity of valued resources is enhanced perspective, social and economic interrelations among firms and common dependencies on a by maximizing the fit between a firm's resources and the political and cultural context of the firm. range of external actors are sources of pressures for isomorphism or conformity that give rise to This means that firms using equally valuable resources may earn very different returns as a firm homogeneity. Isomorphism pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) refer to influences function of the degree of support generated within the firm for the use of these resources. These for conformity exerted on firms by the government, professional associations and other external propositions also imply that strategic and institutional isolating mechanisms may interact to constituents that define or prescribe socially acceptable economic behavior (Scott, 1995) . explain competitive advantage. For example, a These pressures cause firms to tend toward homo-factor markets, particularly specialized expertise (e.g., a joint venture to gain access to complex geneous structures and strategies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . technological or product development capabilities) and intangible assets, such as repuApplying institutional insights to a resourcebased view suggests five main sources of firm tation (e.g., a global alliance formed with a local host to enhance the firm's reputation in the local homogeneity: regulatory pressures, strategic alliances, human capital transfers, social and pro-market). Alliances allow firms to tap into time compression diseconomies and history-dependent fessional relations, and competency blueprints. These sources of firm homogeneity all stem from competencies that are difficult to trade in strategic factor markets. Other types of interorganizational a firm's embeddedness in social and economic relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Oliver, 1996 ; relations (e.g., corporate board interlocks, firm linkages to the state) can reduce resource barriers Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990) . These influential relations are, respectively, relations to govern-as well by facilitating resource information exchange (Carroll, 1993) . ment, business partners, personnel recruited from competitors, business friends and professional associates, and consultants and other sources for Human capital transfers learning about competitors' business practices. These relations reduce firm homogeneity by Sometimes the reputation of a firm or the tacit nature of one of the firm's key competencies affecting the distribution and mobility of resources across firms, by exposing firms to com-resides with particular individuals within the firm rather than with the firm as a whole. When this mon social influences, and by defining what resources firms should be permitted to acquire is the case, tacit or intangible assets become tradeable through human capital transfers between and deploy.
firms. Top management succession and the recruitment from competing firms of key personRegulatory pressures nel with specialized knowledge or technical expertise are two examples of this. Competencies Regulatory environments constrain heterogeneity by prescribing uniform resource standards, com-and capabilities available through transfers reduce asymmetrical distributions of competencies across petencies, and ways of deploying resources across given industries and by defining what resources firms, which in turn reduce firm heterogeneity and opportunities for above-normal returns. As are socially acceptable or permissible as inputs (e.g., safety standards, use of nonhazardous Porter (1980: 172) has observed, 'personnel turnover increases the number of people who have materials). Regulatory pressures include, for example, affirmative action requirements that proprietary information and may provide a direct conduit for the information to other firms.' It define acceptable human capital inputs and pollution control standards that prescribe acceptable should be noted, however, that personnel transfers are limited as a means of obtaining competencies technological inputs (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) . These pressures because many skills and competencies are not vested in single individuals, but reside instead limit diversity by constraining the range of firms' permitted resource options and by imposing com-within the collective skill sets of many employees or within special routines embedded more broadly mon societal expectations across competing firms about how inputs should be combined and in the firm's operations and knowledge base (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . When skills are difdeployed in production.
fused through the firm or dependent on collective knowledge, efforts to lure away particular individStrategic alliances uals will be a less effective means of acquiring valued competencies. Firm heterogeneity is reduced when a firm is able to overcome barriers to resource mobility and gain access to specialized, tacit capabilities (Reed Social and professional relations and DeFillippi, 1990). Strategic alliances allow firms to procure assets, competencies, or capabili-Like strategic alliances and human capital transfers, social and professional relations among firms ties that are not readily available in competitive exemplify the porous nature of firms' boundaries reduce firm heterogeneity by increasing the availability and competitors' level of understanding of and the interpenetration of firms within and across industries. Social and professional relations refer firm capabilities.
In summary, these five sources of influence on to friendship ties, business clubs, industry trade associations, and professional and occupational firms, rooted in regulatory and interfirm relationships, tend to reduce firm heterogeneity and associations. Trade and professional associations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) reduce firm hetero-resource mobility barriers. These influences are now summarized in the following five proposigeneity by articulating shared norms, standards, and rules of conduct among competing firms tions: (e.g., product quality standards developed by Proposition 5a: Resource differences will be trade associations, industry-wide ethical codes of more likely to lead to firm heterogeneity and conduct, uniform training or credentialing in differential rents when regulatory environments occupational professions). In addition, the embeddo not impose similar resource rules and standedness of economic behavior and resource dards on all firms in the same industry. exchange in social and professional networks
Proposition 5b: Resource differences will be tends to increase trust and shared understanding more likely to lead to firm heterogeneity and among firms (Granovetter, 1985) DiMaggio and Powell (1983: tation. 152) argue that the use of consultants reduces diversity among large firms: 'large organizations To summarize, these propositions specify the interfirm-level factors that constrain the likelihood choose from a relatively small set of major consulting firms which, like Johnny Appleseeds, of heterogeneity among firms in the same industry. These propositions suggest that even when spread a few organizational models throughout the land.' From an institutional perspective, the the potential exists among firms for differential rents, the regulatory and interfirm context of firms tendencies for organizations to imitate one another are an important source of firm homoge-will affect the magnitude of these differences.
Therefore, both resources and the institutional neity and uncertainty reduction (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1985 ; Galaskiewicz and context of resources determine firm heterogeneity and economic rents. Wasserman, 1989) . When firms copy one another in their approaches to quality control, inventory management, product development, or organizational structuring, the effect is an overall APPLICATION OF THE MODEL:
RESOURCE CAPITAL AND reduction in structural and strategic diversity.
From a strategic perspective, imitation is also INSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL viewed as a rational alternative to innovation when the risks and development costs of pio-It has been proposed that normative rationality, institutional isolating mechanisms, and isomorneering are high. Effective competency blueprints phism pressures, at the individual, firm, and tied to competency sharing and resource innovations, ongoing monitoring of internal cultural interfirm levels of analysis respectively, affect firm heterogeneity. How can we apply these ideas and political support for exisiting resource capital, the development and use of hiring criteria that more specifically to the promotion of competitive advantage? One way is to conceive of firms as emphasize resource innovation and leading-edge resource expertise; and the use of decentralized possessing both resource capital and institutional capital. The term 'capital,' as used here, denotes cross-functional team-based structures to facilitate continuous resource improvement and reduce cona durable but not necessarily tangible resource or capability that yields services over its lifetime that formity to taken-for-granted resource routines.
Some of the factors that deplete resource capicontribute to sustainable competitive advantage. Resource capital can be defined as the value-tal include security leaks, hiring away of key personnel, and a lack of management emphasis enhancing assets and competencies of the firm. Institutional capital can be defined as the firm's on loyalty and dependability. Factors that deplete institutional capital include stagnant cultures, capability to support value-enhancing assets and competencies. Institutional capital is the context management loyalty to outdated traditions, low levels of management-employee trust, and vested surrounding resources and resource strategies that enhances or inhibits the optimal use of valued interests in the status quo. Any efforts to protect firm operations from these depleting factors can resource capital. For resource capital, the key success factor is the protection and procurement also contribute to competitive advantage.
Together, the factors that support and deplete of rare inimitable assets and competencies. For institutional capital, the key success factor is resource capital and institutional capital imply particular ideal structural characteristics within the effective management of the firm's resource decision context. Examples of resource capital firms. These include decentralized structures, incentive systems that reward resource innoinclude superior distribution channels, lean cost structures, patented core competencies, nonappro-vations, cross-functional team-based structures to facilitate learning, formal resource evaluation syspriable talent, and customer loyalty (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993) . Examples or measures of tems, horizontal information technology flows, and employee selection and development proinstitutional capital might include training programs that accelerate the adoption of new capa-grams that emphasize resource expertise and learning. Ideal resource strategies include continbilities within the firm's operations, information technology systems that accelerate the diffusion ual monitoring of customer and competitor perceptions of firm resources, customer-driven and use of resource capital, management development programs that promote continuous resource resource investments, efforts to reduce personnel turnover around core competencies, management improvement, decision support systems that encourage resource innovations, and interfirm attention to employee buy-in on the purchase and use of key resources, and global benchmarking alliances across different industries that facilitate new resource learning and knowledge sharing.
of core resource practices. The foregoing examples of resource capital and institutional Resource capital and institutional capital, as complementary sources of competitive advantage, capital are summarized in Table 3 . The next, and final, section examines implications for future might be procured in several ways. Approaches to obtaining or enhancing resource capital include: research. formal evaluations of resource capital on an ongoing basis to ensure currency and optimal value; interindustry or global benchmarking of resource FUTURE RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS practices to avoid tendencies to imitate withinindustry capabilities that are already accessible and therefore of lower sustainable value; and A key implication of this paper is that firms need both resource capital and institutional capital for the cultivation of exclusive interfirm linkages in different industries and countries to maximize the longer-run competitive advantage. Future research can examine both resource and institutional capipotential for accessing novel, specialized resource information. Different ways to obtain or enhance tal as potential sources of competitive advantage.
Resource capital is indicated by a firm's strategic institutional capital include firm incentive systems and Schoemaker, 1993: 36) , includ-are developed, managed, and diffused. This suggests that longitudinal studies of the process of ing technological capability, brand management, superior channel access, a favorable cost struc-resource development and deployment may be another approach to understanding sources of susture, or R&D capability. Measures of institutional capital include incentive programs that nurture tainable competitive advantage. Given normative rationality and institutional barriers to resource competency sharing, decision support systems that diffuse resource innovations, top management change, two aspects of the resource deployment process may be especially crucial to sustainable team support for valued resources, and training programs that facilitate resource adoption and competitive advantage: the speed with which new capabilities are embedded or integrated into the learning. Research on the combined effects of resource capital and institutional capital on firm firm's existing knowledge base, and the frequency with which capabilities, once integrated into the performance might be one approach to testing the paper's ideas (e.g., measures of technological firm, are reevaluated and realigned. Future research on the process of resource accumulation capability could be combined with surveys of top management's opinions supporting the use of this and deployment might examine, for example, how firms are able to reduce time compression disecapability). Alternatively, the compatibility between resource use and human resource man-conomies (using intensive personnel training, for example), how firms actively manage their culagement practices that support resource use (e.g., compensation systems, training programs) could tures to encourage organizational learning, how firms diffuse new competencies rapidly through be investigated and tied to firm performance.
Another implication of the paper's proposed the firm (through special communication processes or team-based structures, for example), or model is that future research on sustainable advantage should focus not only on the attributes how firms mobilize political support for new capabilities that run counter to the firm's traof firm resources (e.g., their rarity, uniqueness, or nonsubstitutability) but also on how resources ditions. As an institutional perspective suggests, even highly productive, inimitable resources will resource-based perspectives. The development of this model is consistent with Barney and Zajac's be of limited value without the organizational will or political support to deploy them.
(1994) call for an organizationally based theory of competitive advantage and with Rao's (1994) In addition, researchers need to examine the taken-for-granted aspects of a firm's resource call for more convergence between institutional theory and the resource-based view. This paper strategies because these institutionalized processes are the most invulnerable to reassessment and also builds on work that adopts a more behavioral approach to the examination of competitive realignment. Taken-for-granted practices are often revealed in those firm practices that have endured advantage (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1992; Barney and Hansen, 1994; Ginsberg, 1994 ; the longest, were initiated at founding, or are widely shared across firms in the same industry Zajac, 1992) .
It has been proposed that at the individual or sector. For this reason, historical, cross-sectoral, or cross-cultural research designs are level of analysis, cognitive sunk costs and conformity to firm traditions affect economically especially appropriate for identifying taken-forgranted firm activities. Researchers might also rational resource choices and account for firm differences in resource optimization. At the firm conduct qualitative studies of the history of a core competency's development and deployment level, culture and politics, as institutional isolating mechanisms, are critical determinants affecting within a firm, or comparative studies of resource management approaches across strategic groups, resource choices and economic rents; and, at the interfirm level of analysis, the state, professions, industries, or cultures to uncover how institutionalized practices develop.
and interfirm alliances are important sources of influence that mitigate firm heterogeneity and rent Finally, theory and research on external sources of competitive advantage should look beyond the differentials. The key implication of the proposed model is that a firm's ability to generate rents resource and market characteristics of firms to government, society, and interfirm relations as from resources and capabilities will depend primarily on the firm's effectiveness in managing the important influences on firm variation. Governments create heterogeneity within industries (e.g., social context of these resources and capabilities.
Future efforts to identify sources of resource capipatents, monopoly rents) but also reduce heterogeneity by imposing common pressures or stan-tal and institutional capital among competing firms may shed additional light on the managedards on firms in the same sector. Since firms differ in their propensities to conform to regula-ment of both resources and the context of these resources for long-term competitive advantage. tory and public interest group pressures (Oliver, 1991) , the degree to which different firms choose to comply with public opinion, regulatory pressures, and social expectations may be an REFERENCES important source of firm variation. Institutional theory's emphasis on organizational networks also Amit, R. and P. J. H. Schoemaker (1993) . 'Strategic assets and organizational rent', Strategic Managesuggests the importance of firms' relations as a tutional capital might be a valuable line of inquiry Barney, J. B. (1986) . 'Strategic factor markets: Expecin future research on sustainable competitive tations, luck and business strategy', Management advantage.
Science, 31, pp. 1231-1241.
In conclusion, this article has proposed that Barney J. B. (1991) . 'Firm resources and sustained the process of acquiring resources and sustaining
